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A WALK IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORCHARD: DISTINGUISHING FRUITS OF
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
FROM SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN FELLERS V. UNITED STATES
1. INTRODUCTION
After a grand jury indicted John Fellers for conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, two officers visited him at his home on February 24,
2000, to make an arrest. 1 The officers deliberately elicited statements in
violation of Fellers's Sixth Amendment right to counsel before presenting
him with a waiver of that right.2 Fellers signed the waiver and reiterated his
inculpatory statements.' The reiterated statements were then used against

him at trial.4 Under the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the Supreme
Court has held that statements repeated after waiver should not be treated as

the inadmissible "fruit" of statements taken in violation of the right to
counsel before waiver, but rather as admissible evidence.5 Whether this
same standard should apply to the fruits of a Sixth Amendment violation

1 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 521 (2004). This note was completed before the
Eighth Circuit handed down its decision in Fellers on remand, which can be found at United
States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit rejected some of the
arguments here and chose not to consider others. But given the circuit court's reliance on
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) and what I believe is a mistaken analysis of
how the Supreme Court's more recent decisions in United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620
(2004) and Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) affect the Dickerson decision, it seems
likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to rehear the Fellers decision to clarify the
case law and either provide the Eighth Circuit's decision with a seal of approval or overturn.
For the reasons provided in this Note, I think the latter decision is warranted.
2 See infra Part IV.A.
3 Fellers,540 U.S. at 521-22.
' Id. at 522.
5 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985). But see infra Part V.B.4 for a discussion
contrasting Elstad with the 2004 decision in Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004). A
discussion of the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine occurs infra Part II.B.
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States. The Supreme Court
was the question presented in Fellers v. United
6
remanded the question to the Eighth Circuit.
This Note will examine whether waiver of the Fifth Amendment right
to counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel require different
standards when applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine or
whether the precedent of Oregon v. Elstad7 should control analysis for both
amendments. First, this Note will explain that the Supreme Court properly
applied its own deliberate-elicitation standard in overturning the Eighth
Circuit's holding that a Sixth Amendment violation had not occurred. With
that question disposed, the bulk of this Note will analyze the question
remanded to the Eighth Circuit - should Elstad control "fruits" analysis
regarding a Sixth Amendment violation? It will answer that Elstad should
not control.
In light of recent decisions, the right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment remains a prophylactic measure, which acts as a proxy for
determining whether the Fifth Amendment has been violated.8 If the
prophylactic measure is violated, it is presumed that the constitutional rights
of the Fifth Amendment were violated.9 While these prophylactic rights are
constitutionally protected, 10 their violation does not constitute a
constitutional violation until statements derived from the violation are used
in a criminal case.'1 Hence, it made sense for the Elstadcourt to find that a
waiver could remediate a Miranda violation,2 because the waiver could rebut
the presumption of constitutional violation.'
6 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 525.
7 470 U.S. 298 (1985). A discussion of Elstad occurs infra Part II.D.
8 United States v. Patane, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004) ("[T]he Miranda rule is a
prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause.");
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) ("We have likewise established the Miranda
exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by
the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause ...").
9 Patane, 124 S.Ct. at 2627 (During custodial interrogations "the Miranda rule creates a
presumption of coercion, in the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrebuttable
for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief."); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 ("Failure to
administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion ....Thus, in the
individual case, Miranda'spreventative medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant
who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.").
10Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
"1Patane, 124 S.Ct. at 2629 (arguing that the Miranda right protects a trial right so that
constitutional violations only occur "upon the admission of unwarned statements into
evidence at trial"); Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767 ("Statements compelled by police interrogations
of course may not be used against a defendant at trial... but it is not until their use in a
criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.").
12 Patane, 124 S.Ct. at 2630 ("[I]t must be remembered that statements taken without
sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed to have been coerced only for certainpurposes
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But the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is a constitutional
right. 3 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not presumed violated
when breached, it actually is violated. Thus, subsequent waiver of the right
does not rebut the presumption of a constitutional violation when engaging
in Sixth Amendment, as opposed to Fifth Amendment, analysis. The
Eighth Circuit should hold that Elstad does not apply to the Sixth
Amendment. It should exclude the post-waiver statements made by Fellers
as inadmissible fruits of a prior constitutional violation. In Fellers,
constitutional rights were violated as opposed to prophylactic rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TWO RIGHTS TO COUNSEL
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide two different sources for the
right to counsel. "The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled selfincrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations ....
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also provides
the right to counsel at postarraignment interrogations." 14 Although the
layperson may not grasp the differences between these two distinct rights to
counsel, differences do exist. 15 These distinctions exist because the
amendments serve different purposes.
1. Miranda'sProphylacticRight to Counsel
In possibly the most famous case of constitutional criminal procedure,
Miranda v. Arizona,16 the Supreme Court set out procedural safeguards for
ensuring the protections of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. 17 The Fifth Amendment had previously developed as a ward
against the evils of the Spanish Inquisition and the Star Chamber in
England where subjects were compelled through torture and other barbaric
means to admit their guilt to various crimes whether they had committed

and then only when necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.") (emphasis
added).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.").
14 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986).
15 In Jackson, the Supreme Court agreed: "Although judges and lawyers may understand
and appreciate the subtle distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel, the average person does not." Id. at 633 n.7.
16 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... ").
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them or not.18 But as the United States matured as a nation, the Fifth
Amendment came to serve goals of both deterring police misbehavior in the
interrogation process and assuring the trustworthiness of the evidence
derived from a witness's testimony. 19 Concerns about police misbehavior
and trustworthy evidence arise when the state has the opportunity to engage
in coercive behavior. With the Fifth Amendment, compulsion is the
watchword, but the unspoken rule of the court decisions seems to focus on
coercion.20 Miranda governs testimony made when the potential for

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974).
19Id. at 447-48. A host of other purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege were
1s

enumerated in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964):
The privilege against self-incrimination.., reflects many of our fundamental values and most
noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited
by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual
balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load,' ... our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,' ... our distrust of selfdeprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the
guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.'
But see David Dolinko, Is there a Rationalefor the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination?,33
UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1986) (critiquing the major theories behind the Fifth Amendment
privilege).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) ("[T]he
Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise of Fifth
Amendment rights from the government 'compulsion, subtle or otherwise,' that 'operates on
the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been
once invoked."'); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) ("The Fifth Amendment
prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony.").
Coercion and compulsion are not the same thing. Compulsion deals with overcoming
free will, but coercion focuses on a more normative assessment of whether force or the threat
of force has been used in an attempt to compel someone. The use of compulsion in the text
of the Constitution has led the Supreme Court to use the two words interchangeably, which
means that analysis has focused on whether inappropriate pressure (generally coercion) has
been brought to bear on a suspect rather than whether pressure overcame a person's free will
(compulsion). The impossibility of measuring whether or not free will has been overcome
(compulsion) has led the court to focus on the practical test of whether force has been applied
or not (coercion) in determining violations of the Fifth Amendment. For a discussion of
compulsion and free will within the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, see
Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained andIts Future
Predicted,94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 250-56 (2004).
To avoid confusion, this Note will follow the Court's convention of using the words
interchangeably with the understanding that when the word compulsion is used in modem
court cases, it includes an underlying assumption of a coercive element of force or the threat
of force.
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coercion by officers of the state is greatest: during custodial interrogation.2 1
To help protect against this coercion, Miranda includes a right to counsel
during custodial interrogation. 22
When a violation of the Fifth Amendment does occur, there are two
major remedies. The first remedy is the exclusionary rule.
The
exclusionary rule developed to deter police from violating the Fourth
Amendment.23 It mandates that that "evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment [or the fruits of such evidence]... cannot be used in a
criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. 24
Excluding evidence at trial lies at the core of the Fifth Amendment
exclusionary rule as well, but the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule is
actually in the text of the Amendment itself and therefore is selfexecuting. The second major remedy for violations are § 1983 actions,
where a plaintiff seeks monetary damages.26 Given the Court's focus in
Fellers on the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be applied
or not, this Note does not explore § 1983 actions.

21 Edwards v. Arizona, 451

U.S. 477, 482 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("[W]ithout

proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of
crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."). The
Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." Id. at 444. For a discussion of what qualifies as "interrogation" and
"custody," see RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 750-78
(2001).
22 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 ("The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today,
would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence would insure that
statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of
compulsion.").
23 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
24 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383).
25United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004) ("[T]he Self-Incrimination
Clause contains its own exclusionary rule. It provides that [n]o person.., shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Unlike the Fourth
Amendment's bar on unreasonable searches, the Self-Incrimination Clause is selfexecuting.") (internal quotations omitted).
26 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). For a discussion of the history of § 1983, see Monell v.
Departmentof Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); David Achtenberg, A "MilderMeasure
of Villainy ": The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Meaning of "Under Color
of' Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1999).
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2. The Sixth Amendment's ConstitutionalRight to Counsel
English precedent established many of the legal modes in the early
United States, but the two systems diverged on the right to counsel. At the
time of the framing of the United States Constitution, English law "forbade
the assistance of counsel in nearly all criminal cases., 27 Many theories exist
for the English prohibition on counsel, but the most prominent is that
criminal cases were brought by private parties in England, so there was no
need to level the playing field as both prosecutor and defendant were
equally unskilled in the law. 28 In the United States, however, a public
prosecutor system developed, which meant criminal lawsuits were brought
by professional prosecutors who had handled numerous cases and were well
versed in the science of law.29 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
developed out of a need to "minimize the public prosecutor's tremendous
advantage" and ensure fairness in the adversarial system.30
In McNeil v. Wisconsin,31 the Supreme Court explained that the
"purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee... is to 'protec[t] the
unaided layman at critical confrontations' with his 'expert adversary,' the
government, after 'the adverse positions of government and defendant have
solidified' with respect to a particular alleged crime., 32 To protect the
layman, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches once the
government's role has "shift[ed] from investigation to accusation. 3 3 Once
the government has decided to prosecute the case, it has moved from stage
one, where the information-gathering State is not in opposition to the
suspect, to stage two, where the State has expressed its intention to press
charges. In stage two, "the prosecutorial forces of organized society" are
arrayed against the suspect (now the accused).34 He needs his own
champion to level the playing field. Hence, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel rides in on its white horse (or slithers in on its serpent depending on
one's perceptions) with the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.35
27 Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel

Doctrine,97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1635, 1638 (2003).
28 id.
29 id.

30 Id.at 1640.

"1501 U.S. 171 (1991).
31 Id.at 177-78 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
33Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,430 (1986).
34Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (quoting Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189).
35Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972). Such proceedings are initiated by
"formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689). The Sixth
Amendment therefore differs from the Fifth Amendment, where formal proceedings play no
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Once the Sixth Amendment right has attached, it is applicable during all
"critical stages" that might impact "the accused's right to a fair trial. 36
And, unlike the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the Sixth
Amendment
37
right to counsel is written in the text of the constitution itself.
When the Sixth Amendment is violated, the typical remedy is
exclusion of the evidence at trial.38 Exclusion is not constitutionallymandated by the Sixth Amendment, as it is by the Fifth Amendment,3 9 but
rather it has been crafted by the Supreme Court as a remedy to deter
violations.40
B. "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" DOCTRINE
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine first appeared in the 1920
case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.41 In that case, the
government violated the Fourth Amendment by illegally seizing documents
from the defendants.4 2 After the documents were returned to the defendants
to remedy the illegal seizure, the government sought to obtain the same
documents through a subpoena based on the knowledge that it had acquired
from the initial illegal seizure.43 Justice Holmes explained that "[t]he
role in trumpeting the initiation of the right to counsel. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 21, at
814 ("The adversarial process must be initiated before the Sixth Amendment rights discussed
in Massiah come into play, and custody is not directly relevant to the analysis. The Fifth
Amendment rights discussed in Miranda, by contrast, are relevant only at the point of
custodial interrogation, and the initiation of formal proceedings is irrelevant.").
36 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 236-37 (1967); C. Allen Parker, Jr.,
Note, Proposed Requirements for Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 363, 371 n.49 (1982) (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55
(1961)).
37 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For a discussion of the comparative constitutionality of the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, see infra Part V.B.1.
38 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).
39Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (1981) ("While evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment, or statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his
sixth amendment-Massiah rights are excluded in order to remedy a constitutional violation,
in the Miranda context the exclusion of the incriminating statements is itself the
constitutional right.").
40 The Sixth Amendment protection goes a bit further than the Fourth Amendment
protection, however, in that it would appear to even exclude evidence where the police were
acting in good faith. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). The Fourth Amendment
allows a good faith exception. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). See
Michael J. Howe, Note, Tomorrow's Massiah: Towards a "Prosecution Specific "
Understandingof the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 104 COLuM. L. REv. 134, 145-46
(2004).
4'251 U.S. 385 (1920).
42 Id. at 390-91.
43Id. at 391.
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essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all." 44 Hence, the Court excluded the
subpoena evidence too, because knowledge of its existence was derived
from the illegal search.45
The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" did not attach to this doctrine
until two decades later in Nardone v. United States.46 In that case, the
Court explained that evidence obtained because of the State's wrongful
behavior could not be used "simply because it is used48 derivatively. 4 7 The
derivative evidence was "fruit of the poisonous tree.",
Twenty years later, Wong Sun v. UnitedStates49 expanded the doctrine
to cover verbal or testimonial evidence derived from a Fourth Amendment
violation.50 Justice Brennan explained that the "policies underlying the
exclusionary rule [did not] invite any logical distinction between physical
and verbal evidence., 51 Rather, the question to ask in excluding the fruits
of an illicit search was "whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint., 52 Hence, derivative
evidence could be admitted if sufficient time had passed between the
violation and the later acquisition of the fruit so that the connection between
tree and fruit became "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint., 53 In 1967, the

4 Id.at 392.
45 Id.at 391-92; see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984) (citing Silverthorne
Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 385) ("[I]n Silverthorne Lumber Co.... the Court held that the
exclusionary rule applies not only to the illegally obtained evidence itself, but also to other
incriminating evidence derived from the primary evidence."). There are two major
justifications for the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The first justification argues that
government shouldn't benefit from its own wrongdoing. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 21, at
570. The second justification is that if police know they can use the fruits of illegal searches,
they will have an incentive to conduct illegal searches. Id.To remove this incentive, all
evidence must be suppressed. Id.
46 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
41 Id at 341.
48 Id.
4' 371

U.S. 471 (1963).
'0Id.
at 485.
Id.at 486.
52 Id.at 488 (quoting JOHN MAcARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
51

53Id.at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
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Supreme Court extended the "fruits" doctrine to the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.54
C. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
55
While "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver,"
both the Sixth Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights to counsel may be
waived.56 In Patterson v. United States,57 the Supreme Court decided that
Fifth Amendment waiver is sufficient for waiving the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.58 In so doing, the Court argued that the warnings provided
by Miranda were sufficient to make a suspect "aware of the consequences"
of a decision to waive the Sixth Amendment rights.59
In Edwards v. Arizona,60 the Court provided further protection to the
Fifth Amendment Miranda rights by deciding that once a suspect has
invoked the right to counsel, she may not be subjected to further
interrogation until counsel has been made available or unless she (the
suspect) initiated the "further communication, exchanges, or conversation
with the police. 6 1 The Edwards rule was extended to the Sixth
Amendment in Michigan v. Jackson6 2 to create a prophylactic right in the

54 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984) (construing United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967)). The doctrine's application to the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is
discussed infra Part II.D.
55 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy,
301
U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
56 Id. ("A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.").
5' 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
58 Id. at 296-97. The fact pattern in Patterson left the court free to avoid answering
whether a Miranda waiver obtained before the Sixth Amendment rights attached would be
sufficient to argue that the Sixth Amendment rights remained waived once they finally attach
with the State's initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. Id. at 293 n.5 ("We emphasize
the significance of the fact that petitioner's waiver of counsel was only for this limited aspect
of the criminal proceedings against him-only for postindictment questioning."). As the
right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment is not offense-specific, but the Sixth
Amendment right is offense-specific, there may be good reason to argue that the Sixth
Amendment right should not be waivable until it has at least attached. See discussion infra
notes 245-247 and accompanying text for discussion of offense versus non-offense specific
rights.
'9 Patterson,487 U.S. at 293.
60 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
6 Id. at 484-85.
62 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
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Sixth Amendment context. 63 The Court noted, however, that while the
Sixth Amendment attached with the start of adverse judicial proceedings,
the prophylactic protection provided in Jackson did not attach unless the
defendant specifically requested counsel. 64
D. OREGON V.ELSTAD-BRINGING ALL THE PIECES TOGETHER
In Oregon v. Elstad,65 the Court combined questions of waiver, the
"fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine, and the Fifth Amendment. Elstad is
critical to answering the question presented in Fellers, because the question
remanded by the Supreme Court in Fellers was whether the Elstadstandard
should apply in the Sixth Amendment context.66
Michael Elstad lived with his parents near the home of Mr. and Mrs.
Gilbert Gross.67 After $150,000 worth of art and furnishings were stolen
from the Gross's home, two officers visited the eighteen-year-old Elstad
with a warrant for his arrest.68 One of the officers asked the defendant if he
knew why they had come to his home. 69 Elstad answered no and the officer
asked if Elstad knew a person by the name of Gross. 70 Elstad responded
that he did and that he had heard there was a robbery at the Gross
household.7 ' The officer explained73 that he felt Elstad was involved.72
Elstad responded, "Yes, I was there."

63

See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 177-78 (1993) (discussing

Jackson as "one aspect of [the Court's] Sixth Amendment doctrine [viewed] as
prophylactic").
64Patterson, 487 U.S at 291 ("Our decision in Jackson, however, turned on the fact that
the accused 'ha[d] asked for the help of a lawyer' in dealing with the police.") (alteration in
original). Moreover, the invocation of the Jackson right to Sixth Amendment protection
does not invoke the Edwards right to Fifth Amendment protection against custodial
interrogation absent counsel. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991) ("To invoke
the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke the Miranda-Edwards
interest."). As the Court elaborated, "(tihe holding of Jackson implicitly rejects any
equivalence in fact between invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the
expression necessary to trigger Edwards." Id.at 179.
65 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
66 Fellers v. United States, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (2004).
67 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300.
68 Id.
69

Id. at 301.

70 id.
71 id.
72 id.
73 Id.
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Elstad was taken to the sheriffs headquarters where about an hour
later he was read his Miranda rights.74 The defendant indicated that he
understood the rights, but that he wished to speak with the officers
anyway. 75 He then explained his involvement in the robbery.776 He was
convicted of first-degree burglary, sentenced to five years in prison, and
ordered to pay $18,000 in restitution. 7 After an Oregon appellate court
found that the post-waiver confession should have been suppressed as
tainted fruit from Elstad's earlier pre-waiver admission of guilt, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the State of Oregon's petition for certiorari.78
1. Violations of Miranda Warnings are Prophylacticin Nature,Not
Constitutional9
In reviewing the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals, the U.S.
Supreme Court explained that the Oregon court was incorrect in assuming
that Miranda warnings were accorded the same deference as a
constitutional right under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 80 The
Court wrote:
The Oregon court assumed and respondent here contends that a failure to administer
Miranda warnings necessarily breeds the same consequences as police infringement
of a constitutional right, so that evidence uncovered following an unwarned statement
must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." ,We believe this view
misconstrues the nature of the protections afforded by Miranda
81 warnings and
therefore misreads the consequences of police failure to supply them.

Without a constitutional violation, the primary illegality necessary for
applying the "fruits" doctrine from Wong Sun was missing. The Court
applied its reasoning in Michigan v. Tucker to its decision in Elstad.8 2 It
explained that in Tucker, the officers' failure to provide adequate warning
"did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege.., but departed only
from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this court in Miranda to
safeguard that privilege. 8 3 And "[s]ince there was no actual infringement
74 id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 301-02.

77 Id. at 302.
78 Id. at 302-03.
79 See supra Part V.B. 1 for a discussion of why Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000), did not change the prophylactic nature of the warnings in light of the decision in
UnitedStates v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
'o Elstad,470 U.S. at 304.
81 Id.
82 Id. at

308 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974)).

83 Id. (citing Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446).
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of the suspect's constitutional rights, the case was not controlled by the
doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional violation must
be suppressed., 84 No constitutional harm, no fruit foul!
2. Miranda Violations Create a Presumptionof Compulsion That May be
Rebutted RegardingFruits of the Violation But Not RegardingPrimary
Evidence
The Miranda warnings protect the Fifth Amendment constitutional
right by creating a presumption that the constitutional right has been
violated. 85 The Court excludes testimony acquired in violation of the
Miranda rules, even though the defendant "has suffered no identifiable
constitutional harm., 8 6 But the lack of a constitutional harm in Elstad was
important because it meant that there was no poisonous tree, so the
evidentiary fruit was treated differently. With no poisonous tree, the fruit
was not tainted. Hence, while the Court excluded the primary evidence to
protect the Fifth Amendment, it did not exclude the post-waiver
statements.87
The Court articulated that the presumption of compulsion was
"irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief, [but] does not
require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently
tainted., 88 The fruits did not require exclusion, because the presumption
had been removed by Elstad's waiver. 89 The waiver rebutted the
84

id.

85 The Elstad Court explained: "When police ask questions of a suspect in custody
without administering the required warnings, Miranda dictates that the answers received be
presumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at trial in the State's case in
chief." Id. at 317. In a more succinct comment, the Court stated simply, "[flailure to
administer Mirandawarnings creates a presumption of compulsion." Id. at 307.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 318.

88 Id. at 307. The Court reaffirmed this holding in United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct.
2620, 2630 (2004) ("[It must be remembered that statements taken without sufficient
Miranda warnings are presumed to have been coerced only for certainpurposes and then
only when necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.") (emphasis added).
89 In the impeachment case of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), there was no
waiver to remedy the situation. Id. at 224-25. The Court relied on the fact that while
Miranda had been violated, the Fifth Amendment had not been violated and that not being
able to use evidence for the case in chief would be a sufficient deterrent to keep officers
from violating the Fifth Amendment, so further protection by excluding impeachment
testimony was not warranted. Id. ("Petitioner makes no claim that the statements made to
the police were coerced or involuntary .... Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a
deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence
in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief."). Furthermore,
impeachment has long been recognized as an exception to the exclusionary rule for
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presumption of compulsion for the fruits, because not exercising the
Miranda rights conveyed information that Elstad did not feel compelled.90
Regarding the fruits, the Court added, "there is no warrant for presuming
coercive effect where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though
technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary," but rather in these
cases, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was
also voluntarily made." 91 In Elstad, the waiver for the second statement
helped to remedy the situation
by essentially creating the presumption that
92
the statement was voluntary.
3. The Benefits ofSuppression are Low and the Costs are High
As further justification for not extending the fruits doctrine to Miranda
violations where subsequent waiver had occurred, the Court looked to the
potential benefits of extending the doctrine and found them wanting.93 It
again cited Michigan v. Tucker, this time for the proposition that "neither
the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence would be served by
suppression of the witness' testimony., 94 The Court decided that Tucker's
logic applied in Elstad: "As in Tucker," the Court explained, "the absence
of any coercion or improper tactics undercuts the twin rationalestrustworthiness and deterrence-for a broader rule.''95 The Elstad court
claimed that trustworthiness and deterrence were not concerns after
receiving the Miranda warnings because "the suspect [was] free to exercise

constitutional violations in the Fourth Amendment context, though not necessarily in the
Sixth Amendment context; thus, applying it in the Fifth Amendment context is not a large
leap. See infra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
90See infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
91 Elstad,470 U.S. at 318.
92 According to the Court:
A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission
of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that
the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.
Id. at 314. "If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic
Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself." Id. at 309. If a constitutional violation had
occurred, the waiver in Elstad could not remediate the earlier failure to administer the
Miranda rights, but because only the prophylactic Miranda procedures were violated, no
constitutional violation had occurred and remediation was thus possible.
" Id. at 303-14.
94 Id. at 308 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974)).
9' Id. at 308.
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his own volition in deciding whether or not to make [the subsequent]
statement to the authorities. 9 6
The Court then compared the lacking benefits of suppression to the
costs of suppression. It found that exclusion would come at a "high cost to
legitimate law enforcement activity," 97 because where admissions of guilt
were not coerced, such admissions were "inherently desirable. 'g Thus, in
carrying out its cost-benefit analysis, the Court decided that, without
coercion, there was "little justification... for permitting the highly
of a voluntary confession to be irretrievably lost to the
probative evidence
99
factfinder."
The Court also refused to engage in contemplation of lingering
psychological compulsion simply because the unwarned first statement "let
the cat out of the bag."' 100 With a waiver, the Court contended, "the mere
fact that a suspect has made an unwamed admission does not warrant a
presumption of compulsion." 10 1 With neither a constitutional violation
needing to be remedied, nor any other significant benefits arising from
suppression, the Court refused to extend the fruits doctrine to the facts in
Elstad
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. FACTS OF THE CASE
A grand jury indicted John Fellers for conspiracy to distribute
Shortly thereafter, the
methamphetamine on February 24, 2000.102
Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff and a city police sergeant visited Fellers's
home in Lincoln, Nebraska, to arrest him.10 3 Fellers invited the officers into
his home.104 They informed him of the indictment against him, of the
federal warrant which they held for his arrest, and of their desire to discuss
his involvement in distributing methamphetamine.10 5 The officers named
96

Id. The discussion of Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004), infra notes 257-262

and accompanying text, demonstrates that the Court may have overstated the case that
waiver sufficiently removes worries about the need to deter coercive techniques.
97 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312.
98 Id. at 305 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977)).
'9 Id. at 312.
'oo Id. at 311-14.
'o' Id. at 314.
102 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 521 (2004).
103 Id.
104

Id.

105 Id.
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four individuals included in Fellers's indictment. 10 6 Fellers admitted that10 he
7
knew the four people and that he had used methamphetamine with them.
No one read Fellers's Miranda rights to him until his arrival at the
Lancaster County Jail. 10 8 Upon having his rights read, the defendant signed
a Miranda waiver form, 10 9 which included waiving his right to counsel. He
then reiterated the inculpatory
statements made during the earlier
1
questioning at his home. 0
B. DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
At a preliminary hearing, a magistrate judge recommended
suppression of the statements made at Fellers's home.'
The judge found
these statements were in response to "implicit questions" that were raised
12
by the officers without having read the defendant his Miranda rights."
The magistrate also recommended that portions of the statements made at
the jail "be suppressed as fruits of the prior failure to provide Miranda
warnings."",13
C. DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF NEBRASKA
The District Court suppressed the statements made at Fellers's house,
but admitted the statements made at the jailhouse into evidence over the
magistrate's recommendation, because Fellers "had knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making the statements."' 14
The District Court cited Oregon v. Elstad as controlling. 155
Fellers's jailhouse statements were included in the evidence against
him. 116 He was subsequently convicted of conspiring to possess
methamphetamine with intent to distribute." 7 At sentencing, the District
Court found that Fellers's past criminal conduct warranted sentencing him
to 151 months' imprisonment."'
106

Id.

107

id.

log

Id.

109 Id. at 521-22.

d. at 522.
d0
"n
112

Id.
Id.

113
14

id.

115

Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)).

116

Id.

17

Id.

Id.

118 United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 2002).
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D. DECISION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
On appeal, Fellers argued that his jailhouse statements were fruits of
the statements garnered at his home in violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, and that they should be suppressed. 19 He claimed that the
"the primary taint of the improperly elicited statements made at his home
was not removed by the recitation of his Mirandarights at the jail."'120 The
Eighth Circuit did not agree with Fellers's assessment.' 2 1
First, the appellate court found that the initial statements offered at
Fellers's home did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because no interrogation took place and thus the Sixth Amendment was not
applicable. 122 Second, the appellate court found that Fellers's statements at
the jailhouse were also allowable, because Elstad controlled statements
made subsequent to a Miranda reading and waiver. 123 The court, quoting
Elstad, wrote, "[t]hough Miranda requires that the unwamed admission
must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should
turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and
voluntarily made."' 124 Fellers's jailhouse statements were properly
admitted
125
into the evidentiary record according to the Eighth Circuit.
E. SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI
John Fellers filed a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 126 to determine
whether Fellers's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated and
whether its violation required exclusion of the evidence against him under
127
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

119 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 522.

120 Fellers, 285 F.3d at 724.
121Fellers, 540 U.S. at 522-23.
122 Fellers, 285 F.3d at 724.

123
Id.A concurrence by Judge Riley disagreed with the finding that the statements taken
at Fellers's home were not in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 726-27 (Riley, J.,
concurring). Judge Riley felt that the home statements violated the Sixth Amendment, but
he agreed with the overall result because he accepted the court's second premise that the
jailhouse statements were admissible into the record under Elstaddue to Fellers's voluntary
and knowing waiver of his Mirandarights. Id.at 727.
124 Id.at 724 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985)).
125 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 523.
126 Fellers v. United States, 538 U.S. 905 (2003).
127 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 522-23.
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IV. SUMMARY OF OPINION

A. THE COURT FOUND A SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION

In a succinct and unanimous four-page opinion, Justice O'Connor led
the Court in disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit on both points. 128 The
Supreme Court first held that the information garnered at Fellers's home
was indeed solicited in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 129 The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment right is "triggered
'at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated...
[including] indictment ....
1,1130 The Court wrote that a defendant is denied
his Sixth Amendment rights "when there [is] used against him at his trial
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents...
deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence
of his counsel., 13 1 Because the officers informed Fellers that their purpose
was to discuss his involvement in methamphetamine distribution and
intimated at his association with the charged co-conspirators, the Court
wrote "there is no question that the officers. . . 'deliberately elicited'
information from petitioner.' ' 3 2 By deliberately eliciting information in
their post-indictment discussion with Fellers at his home and without
33
counsel present, the officers violated Fellers's Sixth Amendment rights.
B. THE COURT REMANDED WHETHER ELSTAD APPLIES TO THE FRUITS
OF SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS

The Court then moved on to the second question and proceeded to
determine whether Fellers's waiver of his right to counsel at the jailhouse
permitted admission of his post-waiver statements as per Elstador whether
a different standard applied to fruits after a waiver of Sixth Amendment
134
rights.
The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals's failure to
recognize a violation of the Sixth Amendment at Fellers's home led the
Eighth Circuit to improperly carry out its analysis under the Fifth

121 Id. at 524-25.
129Id.

130Id.at 523 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)).
131Id.(quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)). The Court further

explained that the deliberate elicitation standard for the Sixth Amendment is different than
the custodial-interrogation standard applied in Fifth Amendment cases. Id.at 524.
132Id.at 524 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206).
133 Id.at 524-25.
134 Id.at 525.
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Amendment. 135 As such, "The Court of Appeals did not reach the question
whether the Sixth Amendment requires suppression of petitioner's jailhouse
statements on the ground that they were fruits of previous questioning
conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment deliberate-elicitation
standard."' 36 Finding that it had not previously ruled on whether Elstad
applied to the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court remanded37this second
issue to the Eighth Circuit for a determination of that question.
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's holding that the Lancaster County Deputy
Sheriff deliberately elicited statements from John Fellers was reasonable.
The Eighth Circuit never examined whether "deliberate elicitation"
1 38
occurred, because it mistakenly did not apply the Sixth Amendment.
With no analogous cases directly on point, I will argue that a reasonable
reading of the meaning of deliberate elicitation permitted the Court to find
that the information had been so elicited from Fellers.
The second issue in Fellers was whether Oregon v. Elstad should
apply in the Sixth Amendment context. I contend that Elstad should not
apply to constitutional violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Only a prophylactic violation occurred in Elstad.a39 But as a constitutional
violation occurred here, Fellers should receive greater protection under the
140
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine than was provided in Elstad.
Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel
serve different purposes. The differing purposes of the two rights to
4
counsel have led to divergent applications and standards for those rights.1 '
Suppression of evidence did not serve the purpose of the Fifth Amendment
142
in Elstad, but it does serve the purpose of the Sixth Amendment here.
Finally, the more limited reach of the Sixth Amendment lowers143the cost of
suppression here compared to the cost of suppression in Elstad.

135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. ("We have not had occasion to decide whether the rationale of Elstad applies
when a suspect makes incriminating statements after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
right to counsel notwithstanding earlier police questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment
standards.").
138 United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 2002).
131 See infra Part V.B.1.
140

See infra Part V.B.2.

141 See infra Part V.B.3.
142

143

See infra Part V.B.4.
See infra Part V.B.5.
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Combining the significant differences between the two rights to
counsel, the constitutional violation in the Sixth Amendment context, and
the relatively low costs of applying a different standard in the Sixth
Amendment context, the Eighth Circuit should not apply Elstadto the Sixth
Amendment on remand. It should exclude the incriminating jailhouse
statements as impermissible fruits of the statements obtained in violation of
the Sixth Amendment at his home.
A. THE FINDING OF DELIBERATE ELICITATION WAS REASONABLE
The Eighth Circuit never addressed the Sixth Amendment issue in
Fellers, because it found that no interrogation had occurred and thus the
Sixth Amendment did not apply. 144 But interrogation in the traditional
Miranda sense was the improper standard for the court to apply. As the
Supreme Court explained in Rhode Island v. Innis, "The definitions of
'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term
'interrogation' is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not
necessarily interchangeable.. .,,14'The reason for the difference is that
"the policies underlying the two constitutional protections [the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments] are quite distinct. ' 146 The Fifth Amendment right to
counsel seeks to protect against compulsion resulting from the intimidation
that can occur under direct custodial examination, but the Sixth Amendment
is not concerned with compulsion. 147 It is concerned with the adversarial
roles between the State and the suspect after formal proceedings have been
announced, which is why Massiah elucidated that for the Sixth Amendment
"to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious
interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.' 4 8 As such, the
proper standard is deliberate elicitation.
Deliberate elicitation occurs where officers of the State "creat[e] a
situation likely to induce... incriminating statements without the
assistance of counsel ....
Inducement is "[t]he act or process of
enticing or persuading another person to take a certain course of action." 150
In the present case, after being invited into Mr. Fellers's home, the
Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff told Fellers that he and the police sergeant

144United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 2002).
14'446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980).

Id.
See infra notes 226-244 and accompanying text.
148 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (quoting United States v.
146
147

Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting)).
149United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1980).
150BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 790 (8th ed. 2004).
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were "there to discuss his involvement regarding the distribution of
methamphetamine."''
He then told Fellers that Fellers had been indicted
for the methamphetamine charge and that his indictment stemmed from his
association with four other persons in a "conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine.'0 52
The officer proceeded to name those four
persons.1 3 54It was at this point that Fellers began to share incriminating
statements.1
Given a lack of cases sufficiently analogous to guide the Court
regarding whether the officer's statements qualified as deliberate elicitation,
it was well within the Court's bounds to determine independently whether
the facts constituted "deliberate elicitation." It was not unreasonable for the
Court to determine that the comment made to Fellers that the Deputy
Sheriff and the police sergeant were there "to discuss" Fellers's
involvement meant that they expected Fellers to share in the exchange. 55
The naming of co-conspirators could only further entice Fellers to share
information as the names implied that the officers already had information
and that it would be wise for Fellers to cooperate. The Supreme Court's
decision here provides a 56
strong analogy for future courtroom determinations
of deliberate elicitation.
B. THE ELSTAD STANDARD SHOULD NOT APPLY TO CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
1. Violations of Miranda Remain ProphylacticRather than Constitutional
Violations UntilAdmitted at Trial
As the question on remand in Fellers is whether protections denied to
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel should also be denied to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, 57 it is important to understand that the Fifth
151Joint Appendix at 17-18, Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004) (No. 02-6320).
152 Id. at 18.
153 Id.
154

Id.
155Id.
516And, in fact, Fellers already has been used as precedent for "finding that 'implicit
questions' and 'discussion' ... constitute.., a Sixth Amendment violation." Randolph v.
California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004). The unanimous nature of the decision in
Fellers further supports the conclusion that what qualifies as deliberate elicitation is quite
different from the interrogation standard set down for the Fifth Amendment under Miranda.
It should be noted that the Court felt Fellers's case was not even a close call. The Court
asserted "there [was] no question" that deliberate elicitation occurred. Fellers v. United
States, 540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004).
' Fellers, 540 U.S. at 525.
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Amendment right to counsel is not a constitutional right in the same sense
as the Sixth Amendment right.
Eight years after Miranda established the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel, the Court explained that Miranda'sprocedural safeguards were not
constitutional rights themselves, "but were instead measures to insure that
the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." 158 In the
case of Michigan v. Tucker, a convicted rapist claimed that his Fifth
Amendment rights had been violated because the police failed to advise him
that he could receive counsel free-of-charge if he was indigent. 5 9 The
police had notified him of his other rights, but failed to mention the right to
free counsel. 160 The Court limited the power of the new Miranda
safeguards when it wrote that the police conduct in Tucker "did not abridge
respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
but departed only from the prophylactic standards
later laid down by this
161
Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege."
The prophylactic Miranda rights protected the Fifth Amendment by
acting as proxies for whether a violation of the Fifth Amendment had
occurred. 162 Where prophylactic rights were violated, the Court presumed
that the Fifth Amendment was violated. 163 As Justice O'Connor wrote in
New York v. Quarles, "When police ask custodial questions without
administering the required warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires that the
answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from
evidence at trial." 164 She repeated this rule one year later, writing in

"' Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
Id.at 435.
160 Id. The officers asked Mr. Tucker if he wanted an attorney, whether or not he knew

159

why he had been arrested, and whether he understood his constitutional rights. Id.at 436.
He replied that he understood the reason for his arrest, that he did not want an attorney, and
that he understood his constitutional rights. Id.Tucker's questioning occurred before the
Mirandadecision was handed down. Id.at 435.
161 Id.at 445-46.
162 "[A]s used by the Tucker plurality to describe Miranda, prophylactic rules are not
simply protective devices for constitutional provisions but more importantly... rules that
may be violated without violating the Constitution." GRANO, supranote 63, at 175.
163United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2630 (2004) ("[lIt must be remembered that
statements taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed to have been coerced
only for certain purposes and then only when necessary to protect the privilege against selfincrimination."); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310 (1985) ("The failure of police to
administer Miranda warnings does not mean that the statements received have actually been
coerced, but only that courts will presume the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination has not been intelligently exercised.").
'64467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Oregon v. Elstad, "Failure 165
to administer Miranda warnings creates a
presumption of compulsion.
The Court continued to portray the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
as a prophylactic rather than constitutional right in the 1990s. In Minnick v.
Mississippi,166 Justice Scalia wrote in dissent, "In Miranda v. Arizona,...
this Court declared that a criminal suspect has a right to have counsel
present during custodial interrogation, as a prophylactic assurance that the
'inherently compelling pressures,' ... of such interrogation will not violate
the Fifth Amendment. ' 167 The majority seemed to agree with Justice
Scalia. It repeated Miranda'scharacterization of counsel as "the adequate
protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation
conform to the dictates of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege. His presence
would insure that statements made in the government-established
atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." 168 In Davis v. United
States,169 Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority, "The right to counsel
established in Miranda was one of a 'series of recommended 'procedural
safeguards' ...

[that] were not themselves

rights protected

by the

Constitution but were instead measures to insure
that the right against
1 70
protected.'
was
self-incrimination
compulsory
Miranda rights were prophylactics to supplement protection of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination rather than constitutional
rights themselves, 171 until the Court handed down Dickerson v. United
States172 in 2000. In Dickerson, the Court faced a congressional statute

165 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985). See supraPart II.D. for extensive discussion of this case.
166 498 U.S. 146 (1990).

167 Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 152 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966)).
169 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
170 Id. at 457.

171See generally Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced
Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. Rrv. 929, 968-75 (1995) (discussing
the development of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as a prophylactic measure); see
also Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a
Mere "ProphylacticRule", 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1207, 1214 (1998) (quoting New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)) ("The Miranda right to counsel, therefore, is not itself a
constitutional right, but rather a court-imposed 'prophylactic rule'...."); Beth G. HungateNoland, Note, Texas v. Cobb: A Narrow Road Ahead for the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1191, 1205 (2002) ("the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
which the Court would later refer to as a "prophylactic rule" rather than a constitutional
right, was created").Parker, supra note 36, at 363 n.2 ("[T]he fifth amendment right to
counsel is not considered a direct constitutional guarantee ....
172 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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challenging the Miranda decision.1 73 The Fourth Circuit had allowed the
statute to overrule Miranda on the grounds that the measures put forth in
the Miranda decision were not constitutionally protected, but rather were
prophylactic measures. 174 The Supreme Court disagreed. It explained that
Miranda was a "constitutional decision"' 75 and that it set out a
"constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively."' 76
Writing in dissent for himself and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia excoriated
the members of the majority opinion by citing numerous cases in which
members of the majority had relied upon the prophylactic nature of the
Miranda rights to reach a decision. 177 Justice Scalia
announced that he
78
1
cases.
future
in
Dickerson
uphold
to
refuse
would
Commentators quickly argued that Dickerson augmented violations of
Miranda warnings to constitutional violations. 179 But two recent cases
demonstrate that these commentators asserted too much. In Chavez v.
Martinez,8 0 Oliverio Martinez brought a § 1983 action against Officer Ben
Chavez.' 81 No criminal charges were brought against Martinez, but he
alleged (and the Ninth Circuit agreed) that his Fifth Amendment rights had
been violated, because Officer Chavez questioned him while he was
receiving medical treatment without reading the Miranda rights and
182
continued to question him even after Martinez's requested that he stop.
The Supreme Court explained that because the statements were never used
83
against Martinez in a criminal trial, no constitutional violation occurred.

173

Id. at 432.

174

Id.

175 Id.

Id. at 444.
Id. at 445, 450-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179 One commentator argued that in light of Dickerson, the "well-settled principle
of
criminal law... that a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights results in a primary
illegality" would seem to say that "failure to adequately deliver the Miranda warnings to a
suspect in custody [constitutes] a 'primary illegality."' Conor Bateman, Note, Dickerson v.
United States: Miranda is Deemed A Constitutional Rule, But Does It Really Matter? 55
ARK. L. REV. 177, 212, 219 (2002); see also Mitch Reid, Note, United States v. Dickerson:
UncoveringMiranda's Once Hidden andEsoteric Constitutionality,38 Hous. L. REv. 1343,
1372 ("[T]he violation of the Miranda warning itself is a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.").
180 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
Id. at 764-65 (2003). See supra note 26 regarding § 1983 violations.
Ist
182 Id. at 764-66.
183 Id. at 767 (noting that the suspect "was never made to be a 'witness' against himself
176

177

in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements
were never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case").
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Thus mere violation of the warnings does not constitute a constitutional
violation.
In the 2004 case of United States v. Patane,18 4 the Court asked
whether, after Dickerson, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine applied
to physical fruits garnered from voluntary statements absent Miranda
warnings. 185 The plurality opinion put forth by Justice Thomas admitted the
fruits. 186 Building on the decision in Chavez, Thomas explained that
"police do not violate a suspect's constitutional rights (or the Mirandarule)
by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full
panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda. Potential violations occur, if
at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at
trial." 87 After Pataneand Chavez, a violation of the prophylactic warnings
does not constitute a constitutional violation,188 but use of statements in the
189
courtroom obtained in violation of those prophylactics does.
Because a hole in the prophylactics does not birth a constitutional
violation until it leaks into trial, the violations are only fatal to the inclusion
of evidence obtained directly as a result of the violation. 190
The
presumption of a Fifth Amendment violation is irrebuttable for determining
whether to exclude evidence obtained from a violation of Miranda,but the

184 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2629 (2004).
185 Id.

186 Id.at
187Id.at

2624.
2630.

188 Id. at 2628 ("Our cases.., make clear the related point that a mere failure to give
Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's constitutional rights or even the
Mirandarule.").
189 This follows from the text of the Fifth Amendment: "nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. There is nothing to
prevent a person from being compelled to be a witness against himself outside of the
criminal case. It is only in the criminal case that the Fifth Amendment can be violated.
Hence, the answer to Bateman's article about Dickerson, supra note 179, would seem
to be that Mirandaas a constitutional rule does not matter as much in the judiciary system as
it does in the legislative arena where constitutional imprimatur for Miranda prevents
legislatures from tinkering or overturning the ruling. The one place that it might matter in
the judiciary is in § 1983 actions where a constitutional violation now certainly occurs when
statements taken in violation of Miranda make their way into a courtroom.
190 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2627-28.
The definition of prophylactic turns on that
distinction: "A rule is prophylactic only when the rule may be violated without violating the
Constitution." GRANO, supra note 63, at 191. Professors Doff and Friedman argue for
understanding "what the Fifth Amendment requires is not every aspect of the Miranda
procedure, but only that an accused learn of the right not to speak with the police, and that
the interrogation take place in a manner that permits the suspect to exercise that right at any
time." Michael C. Doff & Barry Friedman, Shared ConstitutionalInterpretation, 2000 SuP.
CT. REV. 61, 78 (2000).
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presumption can be rebutted when deciding whether to exclude subsequent
statements as the "fruits" of those statements.1 91
There are then two possible interpretations for the legitimacy of Elstad
after Dickerson and Patane. The first possibility is that no constitutional
violation occurred in Elstad, because the presumption of compulsion was
rebutted by the better-late-then-never reading of the Miranda rights and
subsequent waiver. As both the pre-waiver and post-waiver statements
were presumed not coerced, introduction of the pre-waiver statements at
trial would not have been a constitutional violation, but merely a violation
of the non-constitutional prophylactic, which would still require exclusion.
The second possibility is that any use of the pre-waiver statements at trial
would have been a constitutional violation, but because the pre-waiver
statements were not used at trial, there was no constitutional violation. In
either interpretation of Elstad, the post-waiver statements (with the
presumption of compulsion rebutted by the Miranda warnings and waiver)
were untainted
by a constitutional violation and therefore admissible at
192
trial.

2. ConstitutionalRights (at Stake in Fellers) Receive More Protection than
ProphylacticRights (at Stake in Elstad)
When the officers violated John Fellers's constitutional right, it is clear
that they violated a different sort of right than the mere prophylactic right in
Elstad.193 The Supreme Court has provided constitutional rights such as
those in Fellers with significantly more protection than prophylactic rights.

191

In Oregon v. Elstad, Justice O'Connor's majority held that "the Miranda

presumption, though irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief, does not
require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted." 470 U.S. 298,
307 (1985). In Patane, the majority watered down the language even more by adding the
modifier "generally" to its statements. 124 S. Ct. at 2627. "To protect against [the coercion
inherent in custodial interrogations], the Mirandarule creates a presumption of coercion, in
the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrebuttable for purposes of the
prosecution's case in chief." Id.
For further discussion about rebutting the presumption of compulsion, see supra Part
II.D.2.
192 The distinction between these two interpretations is not important in Elstad. But if
we imagine a case where the pre-waiver statements were mistakenly allowed into the
courtroom by a trial judge, the distinction could then make a difference as a constitutional
violation would occur in the second interpretation, which might lead a reviewing court to
then find the "fruits" inadmissible, too, as their status would now include being derived from
a constitutional violation simply because the first statements made their way into the
courtroom. This would seem to be an odd result, but a legitimate interpretation of the case
law.
193 See supra Part V.B.1.
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For instance, the Court has allowed derivative evidence and impeachment
evidence into courtrooms where prophylactic rights have been violated.' 94
But it has not allowed the admission of derivative evidence where
constitutional rights have been violated,
following the fruit of the poisonous
195
tree doctrine laid out in Wong Sun.
Michigan v. Tucker is the first case that finds the fruits of mere
prophylactic measures admissible into evidence.' 96 In that case, the
defendant requested that Wong Sun be employed to suppress witness
testimony discovered thanks to a statement made by the defendant "without
having received full Miranda warnings."' 197 The Court rejected the
argument and admitted the witness testimony because the unwarned
questioning, "did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege.., but
departed only from the prophylactic
standards... laid down... in Miranda
' 98
to safeguard that privilege."'
Oregon v. Elstad followed in the footsteps of Tucker and refused to
apply the fruits analysis to mere prophylactics. 199 Discussed in detail earlier
in this Note, 200 Elstad asked whether a statement of guilt obtained after a
waiver should be treated as the fruit of a statement of guilt taken in
violation of Miranda before the waiver. The Court determined that there
was no primary illegality, because there was no constitutional violation,
merely a prophylactic violation,
and thus there was no poisonous tree so
20 1
there could be no tainted fruit.
Patane
reaffirmed these cases and claimed that Dickerson did as
20 2
well.
In Michigan v. Harvey,2 °3 we find the lone case where evidence was
admitted after a violation in the Sixth Amendment context. But Harvey is
the exception that proves the rule. In Harvey, the Court admitted
impeachment evidence after the Jackson rule had been violated, i.e. after
police approached a suspect without counsel present to elicit information

194 See GRANO, supra note 63, at 175-76 (discussing prophylactic cases
in the Miranda
context).
19' 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
196 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
197 Id. at 437.
19' Id. at 446.

'99 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
200
201
202
203

See supra Part II.D.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004).
494 U.S. 344 (1990). See GRANO, supra note 63, at 176-78 (discussing prophylaxis in

the Sixth Amendment context).
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when the suspect had already requested counsel's assistance.2 °4 The
Jackson rule is a prophylactic measure. The Court explained that it was not
addressing a constitutional right as it might with other Sixth Amendment
violations,20 5 because only the Jackson prophylactic had been violated.20 6
The Court specifically noted that the facts before it did not reach the
question of whether the evidence would be allowed if a constitutional
violation had occurred.20 7 Moreover, the evidence allowed in was for
impeachment, which is one of the few exceptions carved out of the
exclusionary rule in the Fourth Amendment context.20 8
The Court has carved out a few exceptions to admit evidence
subsequent to violation of a constitutionalright, but they have been limited.
An impeachment exception to the Fourth Amendment has been allowed
where deterrence of police misbehavior would not be affected, 20 9 but not
allowed where the "impeachment exception would significantly weaken the
exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police misconduct. 2 10 The Court
allowed a good faith exception for constitutional violations under the
Fourth Amendment in United States v. Leon. 211 Beyond impeachment,
good faith, issues of standing,2 12 and circumstances where the taint of the
poisonous tree has subsequently dissipated,2 13 the Court has consistently
applied the exclusionary rule when constitutional violations have occurred.
The exceptions for impeachment and good faith have not been applied to
constitutionalviolations of the Sixth Amendment.214

Harvey, 494 U.S. 344.
Id at 353-54 (explaining that the factual record was insufficient to determine if a
"core value" of the constitutional guarantee had been violated and thus noting it was not
considering that issue); see GRANO, supra note 63, at 178 (same).
206 Harvey, 494 U.S. at 349-50. "We have never prevented use by the prosecution of
relevant voluntary statements by a defendant," wrote the Court, "particularly when the
violations alleged by a defendant relate only to procedural safeguards that are 'not
themselves rightsprotected by the Constitution."' Id.at 351 (emphasis added).
207 Id.at 353-54; GRANO, supranote 63, at 178.
208 See ALLEN ET AL., supranote 21, at 577-580.
209 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
210 James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 317 (1990).
211 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
212 For a discussion of standing in the exclusionary context, see ALLEN ET AL., supra note
21, at 556-67. The standing doctrine has no impact on the case at hand as Fellers clearly had
standing.
213 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
214 As already discussed supra at notes 40, 203-208 and accompanying text, United
204
205

States v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990), dealt with a prophylactic of the Sixth Amendment
and the "good faith" exception hasn't been extended to the Sixth Amendment.
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In Fellers, a constitutional right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
was violated.2 15 In Elstad, a prophylactic right was violated.216 The tainted
fruits used in Fellers were not used for impeachment, but were used for the
case in chief. There was no good faith exception claimed, nor was it
claimed that significant time had passed between the poisoning of the tree
and the picking of the fruit to dissipate the taint. Rather, as soon as the first
statements were made in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the arresting
officers escorted Fellers to the jailhouse, obtained his waiver, and harvested
the fruit as Fellers reiterated his prior statements.2 17 Even if good faith or
impeachment exceptions had been claimed, the Court has not yet applied
either exception to the Sixth Amendment when a constitutional right has
been violated.218 As impermissibly tainted fruits of a constitutional
violation under Wong Sun,219 the Eighth Circuit should reject the rule from
Elstadon remand and exclude the post-waiver statements derived from the
Sixth Amendment violation in Fellers.
3. Differing Purposesof the Fifth andSixth Amendments Have Led to
DifferingRules for Their Respective Rights to Counsel
Given that the Court is considering a different rule for the Sixth
Amendment in Fellers than it used for the Fifth Amendment in Elstad, it is
important to understand how the differing purposes between the two
amendments have led to divergent standards, rules, and applications in the
past. For instance, the deliberate elicitation standard of the Sixth
Amendment is a different standard than the Fifth Amendment standard of
custodial interrogation. 220 Compulsion, custody, and interrogation are not
the watchwords for a Sixth Amendment violation. 2 ' Miranda violations
215

540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004). As the Court explained:

Because the ensuing discussion took place after petitioner had been indicted, outside the
presence of counsel, and in the absence of any waiver of petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights,
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the officers' actions did not violate the Sixth
Amendment standards established in Massiah ...and its progeny.

Id.at 524-25.
216 See supraParts II.D.1, V.B.1.
217 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 521.
218 See supranotes 40, 203-208 and accompanying text.
219Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963).
220 Fellers, 540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004).
221 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 n.11 (1980) ("This is not to read a
'custody' requirement, which is a prerequisite to the attachment of Miranda rights, into this
branch of the Sixth Amendment. Massiah was in no sense in custody at the time of his
conversation with his codefendant."); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980).
Deliberate elicitation occurs "whenever state officers intentionally create a situation that is
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occur whenever a suspect is interrogated in custody without provision of the
right to counsel, but "the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel...
even when 222
there is no interrogation and no Fifth Amendment
applicability.
Evidence of the differing application of the two standards is given in
United States v. Wade.223 In Wade, the Court held that the right to counsel
applied at a post-indictment lineup even though the lineup had no Fifth
Amendment implications.2 24 The right to counsel still applied without Fifth
Amendment concerns because there were existing Sixth Amendment
concerns that the defendant's legal inexperience would allow the Stateworking as an adversary with superior knowledge of the legal process-to
prejudice the facts.225
The amendments' purposes illuminate the standards of custodial
interrogation and deliberate elicitation.226 The Fifth Amendment seeks to

protect moral autonomy by eliminating coercive forces, so custodial
interrogation focuses on the suspect's perceptions in determining whether a
violation has occurred (i.e., did interrogation occur in a setting or a form
likely to induce incriminating statements by the accused, regardless of whether he was
interrogated." Parker, Jr., supra note 36, at 373; see also Henry, 447 U.S. at 274-75.
222 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524 (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 n.5 (1986)).
223 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

224 Id. at 223 ("The fact that the lineup involved no violation of Wade's privilege against
self-incrimination does not, however, dispose of his contention that the courtroom
identifications should have been excluded because the lineup was conducted without notice
to and in the absence of his counsel.").
According to the Court, there were Fifth Amendment implications, because there were
no concerns of either interrogation or self-incrimination at the pre-trial line-up. Id. at 22223. Only the Sixth Amendment justified a right to counsel at the line-up. Id. at 224-28.
22 Id. at 235-37.
226 In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court enumerated the difference in the two standards:
[The Sixth Amendment] right, as we held in Massiah v. United States... prohibits law
enforcement officers from "deliberately elicit[ing]" incriminating information from a defendant
in the absence of counsel after a formal charge against the defendant has been filed. Custody in
such a case is not controlling; indeed the petitioner in Massiah was not in custody. By contrast,
the right to counsel at issue in the present case is based not on the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but rather on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in the Miranda
opinion. The definitions of "interrogation" under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the
term "interrogation" is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily
interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are quite
distinct.

446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980) (citation omitted).
See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273 (objecting to the government's effort to "infuse Fifth
Amendment concerns against compelled self-incrimination into the Sixth Amendment
protection of the right to the assistance of counsel"); Hungate-Noland, supra note 171, at
1206.
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that the officers "should have known" would likely make the suspect feel
coerced into testifying against himself?). 227
In contrast, the Sixth
Amendment seeks a fair playing field between the accused and the State, so
deliberate elicitation focuses on the intent of the officers and whether the
State sought unfair advantage.228 The purposes attributed to the two
amendments lead to their divergent suspect-focused and state actor-focused
applications.
For instance, in Illinois v. Perkins,229 a government agent was placed
undercover in jail with a murder suspect who was being held for an
unrelated charge of aggravated battery.230 Working undercover, the agent
gained Perkins's trust by hatching an escape attempt with Perkins. 231 Based
on that trust, the agent elicited incriminating statements from Perkins who
then sought to exclude the statements because the agent had failed to read
him his Miranda rights.232 The Supreme Court admitted the statements into

227

In Innis, the Court wrote:

[T]he term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police... that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus
reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an
added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof
of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely
to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the
police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions,
the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers
that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
446 U.S. at 301-02. See also Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda:

What is "Interrogation"?When Does it Matter? 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 63-64 (1978) (discussing
how the interplay between custody and interrogation creates intimidation that is "at odds
with the privilege against self-incrimination" which violates the Fifth Amendment).
228 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977) (finding a Sixth Amendment
violation where a detective "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information" from
the accused); Halama, supra note 171, at 1214 ("The Sixth Amendment focuses on the
conduct of the police; the Fifth Amendment focuses on whether the suspect felt coerced.").
In UnitedStates v. Henry, the Court elaborated on the Sixth Amendment right:
By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce,.. incriminating statements without the
assistance of counsel, the Government violated... Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This is
not a case where, in Justice Cardozo's words, "the constable ...blundered". .. rather, it is one
where the "constable" planned an impermissible interference with the right to the assistance of
counsel.
447 U.S. at 274-75.
229 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
230 Id.at 294.
231 Id.at 295.
232

Id.
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evidence because the coercion aspect was lacking. 233 "[A] 'policedominated atmosphere' and compulsion are not present when an
incarcerated person speaks freely to someone he believes to be a fellow
inmate. 99234 Using coercion and compulsion interchangeably, the Court
reiterated235that "[c]oercion is determined from the perspective of the
suspect.
Compare the Perkins case to United States v. Henry,236 where the
Court reached the opposite conclusion on essentially the same facts.237 In
Henry, a paid government informant was serving time on the same
cellblock as the accused.238 The government argued that evidence obtained
in conversations between the accused and the informant should be admitted
because prompting by an undercover agent deserves less scrutiny than
prompting by "persons [the suspect] knows to be Government officers. 2 39
The Court disagreed because Henry had been indicted before the
questioning; 240 therefore his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached .241 The government's line of argument sought "to infuse Fifth
Amendment concerns against compelled self-incrimination into the Sixth
Amendment protection of the right to the assistance of counsel., 242 Since
the Sixth Amendment serves to balance the adversarial process, the Court
focused on whether the State actors sought unfair advantage, not on the
suspect's state of mind and whether he felt coerced.243 The Court noted that
Henry was not a case where "'the constable.., blundered' ... [but] rather,
it is one where the 'constable'
planned an impermissible

233

Id. at 296.

234

Id. The term "police- dominated atmosphere" comes from Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 445 (1966).
231 Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296.
236 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
237 Id.
238

Id. at 266. The only major difference in the circumstances of Perkins and Henry

(other than their respective Fifth and Sixth Amendment scenarios) is that the informant in
Henry was a prisoner serving a sentence for forgery who had proved a useful informant in
the past while the informant in Perkins was a Federal Bureau of Investigations Agent. But
this arguably would call for more exclusion in Perkins if the two Amendments sought to
protect individuals against the State, given that the latter case involved information sought
directly from a state actor.
239 Id. at 272-73.
240 1d.at 265-66.
241 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
242 Henry, 447 U.S. at 273.
243 Id.at 271-75.
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interference .... ,,244 Because the State had intentionally sought to take
advantage of its position, the evidence was excluded.
Another important difference for the Fellers/Elstadanalysis is that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is an offense-specific right, which makes
its application significantly narrower than the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel.245 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel only provides protection
for the specific charge or indictment brought against the suspect, which
allows officers to elicit information in the absence of counsel regarding
offenses for which the suspect has not been charged.246 In contrast, the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel is not offense specific. When the
Miranda right to counsel is invoked, it prohibits the police from
interrogating the suspect without counsel present regarding any offense,
even offenses that were previously not under investigation. 247 Thus, if a
suspect invokes his Miranda right to counsel during a robbery investigation,
the right to counsel is also invoked for any other crimes for which the
police may wish to interrogate the suspect from homicide to fraud to other
robberies. This difference plays an important factor in weighing the costs
and benefits of suppression under the two rights to counsel, as seen infra in
Part V.B.5.
Timing when constitutionalviolations occur is yet another difference
between the two rights to counsel. For the Fifth Amendment, as explained
earlier, a constitutional violation does not occur until evidence garnered in
violation of the Miranda prophylactics is used at trial. 248 But for the Sixth
Amendment, a violation occurs anytime after the Sixth Amendment right
has attached when information is "deliberately elicited" from the suspect
without counsel present.2 49 Both of these violations assume, of course, that
244 Id. at 275.
245
246

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991).
Id. In Texas v. Cobb, the Court made it clear that the Sixth Amendment right was

very narrowly tailored as even offenses that were "factually related" would still be treated as
different offenses. 532 U.S. 162, 167 (2001). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel would
not attach for the second offense until an indictment for that offense had been issued. Id;
see Howe, supranote 40, at 139-50.
247 McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177.
248 See supraPart V.B. 1.
249 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004). Additionally, the Court wrote:
Because the ensuing discussion took place after petitioner had been indicted, outside the
presence of counsel, and in the absence of any waiver of petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights,
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the officers' actions did not violate the Sixth
Amendment standards established in Massiah ... and its progeny.
Id at 524-25. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 n.6 (1986) ("In construing
respondents' request for counsel, we do not, of course, suggest that the right to counsel turns
on such a request .. " The Court thus reaffirmed Brewer v. Williams,r430 U.S. 387, 404
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the suspect did not subsequently waive his right to counsel after being read
the Miranda warnings.250
There are numerous other differences between the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.251 But the most
important difference for the analysis here is that the Sixth Amendment
constitutional right may be violated as soon as it attaches with adversary
judicial proceedings while no constitutional violation occurs in the Fifth
Amendment context until trial. 2

(1977) that the "[Sixth Amendment] right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the
defendant ....
"); Jackson, 475 U.S. at 641 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[U]nlike a
defendant's 'right to counsel' under Miranda, which does not arise until affirmatively
invoked by the defendant during custodial interrogation, a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not depend at all on whether the defendant has requested counsel.");
Commonwealth v. Torres, 813 N.E.2d 2161, 1277 (Mass. 2004) (discussing the Fellers
decision and noting "[w]here government agents 'deliberately and designedly set out to elicit
information' from a defendant after Sixth Amendment rights have attached, such conduct
violates those rights").
250 See supra Part II.C.
251 Halama, supra note 171, at 1214-15.
In her article on the Sixth Amendment,
Meredith Halama nicely compares and contrasts the two amendments:
The differences in the purpose and history of the Sixth and Fifth Amendment rights to counsel
cannot be understated. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is in the Bill of Rights and has
been part of our adversarial system for over 200 years; it has applied to pretrial confrontations
for sixty years. By contrast, the Supreme Court created the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
barely thirty years ago. The Sixth Amendment is a right to counsel for its own sake; Miranda's
right to counsel protects the privilege against self-incrimination. The Sixth Amendment exists to
maintain the integrity of our adversarial system as a whole; the Miranda right exists solely to
protect suspects from being compelled to waive their Fifth Amendment rights in custodial
interrogations. The Sixth Amendment focuses on the conduct of the police; the Fifth
Amendment focuses on whether the suspect felt coerced.
Because of the differences in the origins and purposes of the Sixth and Fifth Amendments, they
apply at different times in criminal proceedings. The dangers of an imbalanced adversarial
system that the Sixth Amendment is designed to protect against arise when the government
assumes the posture of an adversary, regardless of custody or interrogation. Conversely, the
Fifth Amendment perils of compelled self-incrimination, by definition, exist only when a suspect
is pressured to divulge his guilt, whether or not adversarial proceedings have begun. Thus, a
suspect may have a Fifth Amendment right to counsel to protect his privilege against selfincrimination at a time when he does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, such as in a
preindictment or prearraignment interrogation. Conversely, the accused will have a Sixth, but
not a Fifth, Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages after the initiation of formal judicial
proceedings, regardless of whether he is in custody or under interrogation. Thus, deliberate
attempts by the state to elicit information from an unknowing defendant (such as by an
undercover agent or wiretap) after he has been indicted implicates the Sixth, but not the Fifth,
Amendment. At all custodial interrogations after the initiation of formal judicial proceedings,
the accused has a right to counsel under both the Sixth and Fifth Amendments.

Id.

22 See supra Part V.B.1.
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4. SuppressionInsufficiently Served the Fifth Amendment Purpose in
Elstad; Suppression in Fellers Protectedthe AdversarialProcess
Guaranteedby the Sixth Amendment
The previous section explained how the different purposes of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments have led to divergent rules and applications of the
two rights to counsel. Their differing purposes argue for different rules in
Fellers and Elstad as well.
The Fifth Amendment protects the substantive right not to be
Miranda employed procedural
compelled to self-incriminate. 53
prophylactics to protect that substantive right.254 Evidence acquired in
violation of the Mirandaprophylactics is excluded because the information
is presumed compelled.25 5 Thus, where the presumption of compulsion has
been rebutted by a waiver, Fifth Amendment concerns no longer exist.
Once compulsion is no longer a factor, the Elstadcourt explained that "little
of a
justification exists for permitting the highly probative evidence
2 56
voluntary confession to be irretrievably lost to the factfinder.
In the 2004 case of Missouri v. Seibert,257 the facts were similar to
Elstad except that police officers had purposefully used a technique of
"interrogating in successive, unwarned and warned phases" to undermine
the Mirandawarnings.2 5 8 Basically, the officers interrogated a suspect until
they obtained a confession, then hurriedly read the Miranda warnings and
secured a waiver before encouraging the suspect to admit guilt again based
on the psychological pressure from the previous admission of guilt only
seconds earlier. The officers were employing the Elstad decision that
confessions after a waiver were not inadmissible fruits of a pre-waiver
confession as a cover. They were playing by the letter of the law rather
than the spirit so the Court punished them to forward the Fifth Amendment
purpose of eliminating coercive pressure.
The Seibert interrogation technique made it impossible for "the
warnings [to] function 'effectively' as Miranda requires., 259 Because the
warnings were undermined, a Waiver based on those warnings could not be
considered a valid waiver for rebutting the presumption of coercion. The
Court explained, "Upon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of
interrogation and just after making a confession, a suspect would hardly
253See supra Parts II.A. 1, V.B. 1.

254 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
255See supranotes 85-86 and accompanying text.
256 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985).
257 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
258 Id. at 2608.
259 Id. at 2610.
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think he had a genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in 26
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In these circumstances, the Court refused to assume that the suspect's
waiver of Miranda-andthus her subsequent statements-were genuinely
free of compulsion: the whole purpose of Miranda. In his deciding
concurrence, Justice Kennedy explained that the scope of suppression under
Miranda depends on "whether admission of the evidence under the
circumstances would frustrate Miranda's central concerns and
objectives., 26 1 Because he and the majority found that the officers'
technique frustrated Miranda'spurpose, the evidence was suppressed.262
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is very different
from the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Its purpose "is to 'protect the
unaided layman at critical confrontations' with his 'expert adversary,' the
government, after 'the adverse positions of government and defendant have
solidified' with respect to a particular alleged crime. 263 The existence of
compulsion is not a clear cut issue, so its presumption may be rebutted; but
assistance of counsel once the State has stepped into an adversarial role is
clear cut. The adversarial role of the State cannot be rebutted; counsel was
either provided or it was not. Worries about the advantages of the expert
adversary during the pre-waiver discussions persist even after a waiver. In
as much as the Sixth Amendment guarantees the fairness of an adversarial
process, the concerns and objectives of the amendment are violated when
expert officers of the State, which has moved from investigatory to
accusatory mode,264 are permitted to ignore the Amendment's protections.
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment was violated in Fellers when the
state moved from the investigatory to the accusatory mode and ignored the
Sixth Amendment's protections. In the Fifth Amendment context, when the
Amendment's purpose has been violated (as in Seibert) suppression has
been found appropriate. When the purpose of the Amendment has not been
violated (as in Elstad), suppression has not been found appropriate. As the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment was violated in Fellers, suppression is
appropriate.

260

Id. at 2611.

261

Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2613 ("Because the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart

262

Miranda's purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted...
Seibert's postwarning statements are inadmissible.").
263 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991) (quoting United States v.
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
264 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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5.The Cost ofSuppression is Lower in the Sixth Amendment Context
The costs and benefits of suppression are lower in the Sixth
Amendment context of Fellers than they are in the Fifth Amendment
context of Elstad.
The Elstad court opposed extending suppression to fruits, because
there was a "high cost to legitimate law enforcement activity [that added]
little desirable protection to the individual's interest in not being compelled
to testify against himself., 265 But suppression does add desirable protection
in the Sixth Amendment context.266
In addition, Sixth Amendment
suppression imposes lower costs on legitimate law enforcement activity,
because Sixth Amendment protection is more limited in its reach than the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel addressed in Elstad.
Under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, officers can prevent
suppression by obtaining a waiver before engaging in questioning.267 But
under the Sixth Amendment, investigators could urge prosecutors to
postpone formal proceedings so that the Sixth Amendment right does not
attach.268 This postponement will allow the investigation stage to continue
without the strictures of the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, the Sixth
Amendment right is offense-specific. It only protects the right to counsel
for the charged offense. 269 Texas v. Cobb further narrowed the Sixth
Amendment right as it refused to allow Sixth Amendment protection even
for offenses that were factually-related to the charged offense.270 The Fifth
Amendment is much broader. Once invoked, it is invoked for all possible
offenses, so that the State may not question the suspect without her attorney
present about any offense that she may have committed. 27' As the Court
noted in McNeil v. Wisconsin, this severely limits questioning because a
suspect might be quite willing to speak to the police about matters that are
not under prosecution.2 72
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See supraPart V.B.4.
267 Id.
268See supra note 35. Note, however, that urging prosecutors to postpone formal
proceedings simply to avoid the Sixth Amendment protections would seem to go against the
spirit of the Sixth Amendment, because it would entail the State's actors exercising their
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superior legal knowledge to manipulate the playing field to provide them with an advantage

against their adversary-exactly what the amendment seeks to avoid.
269 See supranotes 245-247 and accompanying text.
27o532 U.S. 162, 167 (2001). See supra note 246.
271 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) ("Once a suspect invokes the
Miranda right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be
reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present.").
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This discussion does not mean that there are no costs to law
enforcement from deriving a different rule for Fellers. Probative evidence
will be lost as accused suspects receive counsel and counsel advises the
accused to exercise their rights, including the right to remain silent.
Violations by law enforcement officers will also lead to the loss of evidence
through exclusion, although these losses will decline as the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule takes hold.
To the extent that current constitutional rights and other legal
protections available to those accused of crimes raise the costs of law
enforcement and lead to the loss of probative information, the provision of
counsel will further raise these costs by increasing the exercise of those
rights. If the right to counsel has become a tool for impeding accurate
justice, however, the problem lies not with the legal knowledge provided by
the right to counsel. The problem lies with the existence of those legal rules
and interpretations that impede the search for truth in the first place. It is to
those rules and interpretations that the courts and legislatures should direct
reform, not the right to counsel. If the right to remain silent is overly
burdensome on the truth-gathering process, reform to achieve the correct
balance must be directed there.273 Promoting ignorance of legal rights and
rules should not be employed as a stopgap measure for making an end run
around rights and rules that are believed to impede the administration of
justice. Such ignorance is the antithesis of the Sixth Amendment's thesis.
While the costs of suppression were high and the value of suppression
was low in Elstad, the reverse is true in Fellers because the Sixth
Amendment's very purpose has been undermined-a high cost indeedwhile the costs of enforcing that purpose through suppression have been
relatively low. This discrepancy provides further reason for the Eighth
Circuit to differentiate the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment
rights to counsel by refusing to apply the Elstadstandard in Fellers.
VI. CONCLUSION
After ruling that implicit questions by police officers following
indictment constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
,the Court found itself faced with a case of first impression. The Court had
'never answered whether or not the decision in Elstad should apply to
violations of the Sixth Amendment, so it remanded the question to the
Eighth Circuit.

273 And

scholars have argued for such reform.

See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B.

Lettow, Fifth Amendment FirstPrinciples: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV.
857, 919, 922-927 (1995). But see Kamisar,supra note 171.
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In reaching that answer, the Eighth Circuit should remember that
constitutional rights warrant the highest protection in the land. The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel violated in Fellers is a constitutional right,
while the right violated in Elstadwas a mere prophylactic. The violation of
Mr. Fellers's right to counsel constituted a primary illegality, which
warrants exclusionary protection for any evidence obtained by that violation
as fruit of the poisonous tree. On remand, the Eighth Circuit has an
obligation to uphold Fellers's constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. But regardless of the Eighth Circuit's resolution of the matter,
the Supreme Court's own indecision proffers reason to believe that it will
revisit the issue to provide imprimatur or to overturn.274
Like its biblical counterpart, the fruit of the poisonous tree tempts its
suitors with knowledge of good and evil. But also like its counterpart,
partaking of the fruits comes with a high price. An end run around the
Sixth Amendment's goal of protecting an adversarial system risks
undermining the system itself.
Justin Bishop Grewell

274 One commenter has claimed that "[n]o matter how the Eighth Circuit decides this
issue of first impression, it is likely the Court will again review the Eighth Circuit's
opinion." Lt. Col. David H. Robertson, Self-Incrimination: Big Changes in the Wind, ARMY
LAW., May 2004, at 37,47 (2004).

